At Last! Some Foreign Policy

Recently, the Bush campaign fleshed out its earlier position about reorienting how American military forces should be used in the future. The Gore campaign rapidly tore into the Bush proposal as ill-conceived and ill-timed.

Specifically, the Bush campaign, through spokesperson Condoleeza (“Condi”) Rice, proposed that American peacekeepers be removed from the Balkans­Bosnia and Kosovo. The rationale behind this move (which, of course, would only be undertaken after consultation with a NATO clearly aghast at the prospect) was that American forces are overdeployed, should be concentrating on preparing for major wars around the globe, and that peacekeeping is not a proper role for U.S. soldiers. In Rice’s own words, “We don’t need the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.”

The proposal fleshes out a theme raised by Rice at the Republican national convention, when she asserted the United States should not be the “world’s 911.”

The Gore campaign quickly retorted that this proposal was unwise, even irresponsible. They argued that pulling the 11,400 American troops (less than 20 percent of the total) out of Kosovo, as Bush proposes, would eventually undermine the peace being built in the Balkans and would weaken NATO.

Moreover, they argue the reorientation of our forces to engage in more conventional conflicts does not reflect current realities. As Gore advisor Gordon Adams puts it, “We will have a well-funded military that is designed to go nowhere and prepared to do nothing, because they are only there to fight the nation’s wars, and we are not having any.”

Amongst those in the current administration most incensed by the Bush policy proposal is Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright. The Secretary believes the crown jewel in her stewardship of the State Department was forcing Slobadan Milosvic from the presidency of Yugoslavia, thereby opening the possibility of peace in the region. She believes, and many knowledgeable experts in the field agree, that American troops on the ground were a necessary part of bringing the Yugoslav dictator down.

This sudden outburst of foreign policy concern is strange, both in its timing and in substance. Tactically, it makes little sense for Bush, who is widely viewed as in over his head on foreign policy issues, to make an issue out of his weakness. Certainly, the public is not exactly clamoring for a debate on foreign issues, and in that circumstance, one would think that sleeping dogs would be best left lying. So why raise what could become at least a small red flag when the polls seem to indicate the candidate is doing just fine keeping a low foreign policy profile.

The timing is strange for other reasons. The issue of whether the United States should be in Kosovo (and similar places in the future) may excite foreign policy “wonks” in academia and government, but it is hardly going to ignite those middle class suburban housewives – said to be the remaining uncommitted voters – to sign up for the Bush camp. If reducing American deployments has political appeal anywhere, it is with voters in or closely associated with the military, and they, by and large, are already Bush supporters anyway. What is there to gain?

Moreover, the substance of the proposal is, to put it mildly, suspect. Adams is quite right. The only likely uses of American forces in the next decade or so is going to be in peacekeeping-like missions, because that is the only kind of violence that is out there that might need American forces. Even the Department of Defense has admitted as much. In 1997, it issued (as required by law) its first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which concluded the lack of conventional opponents for the U.S. (it called them “peer competitors,” a euphemism for threatening enemies). The 2001 QDR is almost certain to reach the same conclusion.

The focus on removing American physical presence from the Balkans is particularly questionable. It is, for instance, almost certain that there would be no peace in either Bosnia or Kosovo if the United States had not agreed to put troops on the ground. Like it or not, the U.S. is that important in peacekeeping matters. Moreover, it is not as if the U.S. is shouldering an undue part of the load (a charge often leveled in these kinds of situations). There are nearly 55,000 European troops in Kosovo in addition to the American contribution. About the only people who might like to see the United States leave are the French, who would like to increase their own influence over the process there.

This whole matter is very curious. Making a major, possibly wrongheaded, policy proposal, that hardly anyone will care about, two weeks before the election, simply makes no political sense. At its worst, it will paint the Bush team (in addition to Bush himself) as weak, prisoners of the Cold War past from which most of them sprung. After all, the electorate seems satisfied that the candidate is beginning to get the hang for pronouncing the names of foreign places and leaders. Why not leave it at that? The electorate doesn’t seem to care.

It is said that elections are rarely decided on foreign policy questions, which only become important to voters when there is a major crisis in the world. Clearly, there are no such crises now to make voters ask which candidate would provide the best leadership under foreign pressure. When it is not at all clear that your candidate would be the people’s choice should that question be raised, why in the world raise the possibility?

Dr. Donald M. Snow is a professor of political science at The University of Alabama. He has also authored multiple books on international relations, American defense and foreign policy.

Donald M. Snow, professor and director of graduate studies, holds the B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Colorado and the Ph.D. from Indiana University. He has held visiting professorships at the U.S Air Command and Staff College, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Army War College, and U.S. Air War College. His teaching and research interests are in the areas of international relations and

American defense and foreign policy. His recent books include: When America Fights, 2000; From Lexington to Desert Storm and Beyond (with Dennis Drew, 2nd ed.) 2000; International Relations (with Eugene Brown) 2000; United States Foreign Policy (with Eugene Brown), 2000. The Shape of the Future (3rd ed.), 1999; National Security (4th ed.), 1998; Distant Thunder (2nd ed.) 1997; and UnCivil Wars, 1996. His forthcoming books